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RECENT CASE
CRIMINAL LAW - FAILURE TO REQUEST COUNSEL; WAIVER
MIRANDA PER SE EXCLUSION OF CONFESSIONS OBTAINED IN ABSENCE
OF COUNSEL NO LONGER APPLICABLE: WAIVER OF COUNSEL
DETERMINED ON BASIS OF TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES.
After being placed under arrest and given his Miranda rights, t
the respondent made incriminating statements to the arresting
officers. 2 Respondent subsequently made a motion to suppress
these statements on the ground that he had not waived his right to
the assistance of counsel at the time the statements were made. 3
This motion was denied by the trial court and respondent was
subsequently convicted. 4 Adopting a per se rule, the North Carolina
Supreme Court reversed respondent's conviction. 5 Based on its
reading of Miranda, the court refused to admit into evidence any
statement made by a person under custodial interrogation and
without counsel unless, at the time the inculpatory statement was
made, the suspect had explicitly waived the right to counsel. 6 The
1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Coiurt stated as follows: "Prior to any
ucsl I'll Ing. the person rmust be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he
Ies make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed. -d. at 444.
2. North Carolina v. Butler. - U.S. - __-, 99 S. Ct. 1755, 1756 (1979). When asked if
he understnod his rights respondent replied that he did. The respondent refused to sign the waiver at
the bottonm of the F.B.I.'s "Advice of Rights" form. He was told that he need neither speak nor sign
the form. but that the agents would like to talk to him. The respondent replied, "I will talk to you but
I am not signing any form." He then tmade inculpatory statements. Id. Respondent said nothing
when advised of his right to the assistance ofa lawyer. At no time did the respondent request counsel
or attetipt to stop the agent's questioning. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. State v. Butler, 295 N.C. 250. - 244 S.E 2d 410. 413 (1978). The North Carolina
Supreme Court stated that the holding in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) provides that
unless and until a suspect is warned of his rights cinder Miranda and the suspect's specific waiver of
these rights is demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of
interrogation can be used against him. 295 N.C. at , 244 S.E.2d at 413.
6. 295 N.C. at __, 244 S.E.2d at 413. The court stated that the holding in Miranda "provides
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United States Supreme Court reversed and held that an explicit
statement of waiver is not necessary to support a finding that the
defendant waived the right to counsel guaranteed by the Miranda
case,' but the question of waiver must be determined on the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case.8 North
Carolina v. Butler, __ U.S. __ , 99 S. Ct. 1755 (1979).
Not until the second half of the 18th century was it recognized
that some confessions should be rejected as untrustworthy. 9 By the
early 1800's, the whole attitude of judges changed and there was a
general suspicion and prejudice against all confessions, and an
inclination to repudiate them on the slightest pretext. t0 In its
earliest constitutional cases the United States Supreme Court
decided questions regarding the use of confessions under the
privilege against self-incrimination contained in the fifth
amendment of the United States Constitution. This approach was
in plain language that waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation will not be recognized
unless such waiver is 'specifically made' after the Miranda warnings have been given.'" Id.
7.- U.S. at__ 99 S. Ct. at 1758-59 (1979). The Court stated as follows:
lilt appears that every court that has considered this question has now reached the
saie ( onctision. Ten of the 11 United States Courts of Appeals and the courts of at
least 17 states have held that an explicit statement ofwaiver is not invariably necessary
to support a finding that the defendant waived the right to remain silent or the right to
counsel guaranteed by the Miranda case.
Id. Se' cases cited id. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 1758-59 nn.5 & 6.
The United States Supreme Court noted that, although an express or oral statement of waiver of
ti( right to remain silent or the right to counsel is usually strong proofof the validity of that waiver,
the fact of a waiver may be implied from the facts and circumstances of the situation, based on the
a(tions and wor(s if the person interrogated. Id. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 1757.
8. Id. at __. 99 S, Ct. at 1758 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). In
looking at the particular ficts and circumstances of each case the Court in Butler stated that through
the t reation of "an inflexible rule that no implicit waiver can suffice, the North Carolina Supreme
Court has gone beyond the requirements of federal organic law. Therefore its judgment cannot
stand, since a state court can neither add to nor subtract from the mandate of the United States
Constitution." U.S. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 1759 (citing Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719
(1975)).
9. Rex v. Wari kshall, I Leach C. C. 298, 168 E. R. 234 (1783). See generally 3 .1 WtcNsORF,
viiN.C . 822-826 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). The rationale behind the trustworthiness test is that
the ext lusion of a confession is justifiable only when such evidence is rendered unreliable and
untrustworthy by virtue of the means employed to procure it, with the result that its admission would
reate the peril of convicting the innocent. Id.
A commentator states that "in constitutional terms, predicating a criminal conviction on such
ividinic Irendered unreliable and untrustworthy by virtue of the means employed to procure it]
denies the deftnclant a fair hearing and thereby operates to deprive the accused of life or liberty
without due process oflaw." Allen, The Supreme Court. Federalism and State Systems of Criminal Justice, 8
DE PAUL L. REv. 213, 233-34.
10. Brain V. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 549-61 (1897). There was no general rule by which
the admissibility of a confession could be determined, but the courts allowed the rule to evolve from
the fitis of ea It case. Attempts to reconcile the authorities resulted in obscurity and confusion. Id. at
549. ,See .1. Wi;tORE, supra note 9 at § 820(a) for an explanation of the possible reasons for the
irrationality ofthe law of confessions in the early 1800's.
In ont' case a confession given in response to the cautionary statement "anything you say in
vour dei'fnse, we shall le ready to hear" was suppressed as given due to an improper inducement.
Regina v. Morton, 2 Mood & R. 514, 174 E. R. 367 (1843). See also Developments in the Law -
Con/fsions, 79 HAv. I. RFV. 935, 955 (1966).
11. 168 U.S. at 542. In Bram, the Court stated as follows:
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later weakened, however, by the Court's refusal to exclude a
confession given before the suspect had been warned of a privilege
not to speak.' 2 In United States v. Carignan'3 the Supreme Court
expressed doubt about violations of the fifth amendment's
protection against self incrimination as grounds for excluding
involuntary confessions from federal criminal trials. 1
4
In 1936 the Supreme Court initiated a radical change in the
law by using the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of
the United States Constitution rather than the fifth amendment as
grounds for excluding involuntary confessions. 15  The Court
imposed limitations on the admissibility of confessions based on the
fundamental notion that the interrogation at which a confession is
obtained is part of the process by which the state procures a
conviction, and is therefore subject to the requirements of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 16
The central difficulty in the confession cases decided under the
fourteenth amendment was a pervasive ambiguity involving the
rationale or purpose of the rule requiring the exclusion of coerced
confessions from criminal trials. This ambiguity arose from
uncertainty as to whether the rationale was to avoid involuntary or
coerced confessions 7 or whether it was to deter police officials from
using unfair or illegal interrogation methods. 18 The Court avoided
In criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a question arises
whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by
that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
commanding that no person -shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself."
Id.
12. Powers v. United States. 223 U.S. 303 (1912).
13. 342 U.S. 36(1951).
14. United States v. Carnigan, 342 U.S. 36. 41 (1951). See 79 HARV. L. REV., supra note 10 at
961. Secako. 3J. WIGNORF., supra note 9 at 338 n.5.
15. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). In Brown the defendant still had marks from the
ropes that had been used to hang him up in order to obtain his "voluntary" confession. The Court
held that the defendant had been denied due process of law. Id. at 286. See also Haley v. Ohio. 332
U.S. 596. 601 (1947) ("neither man nor child can be allowed to stand condemned by methods which
flout constitutional requirements of due process of law. "): Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227. 240-
41 (1940) ("The constitution proscribes such lawless means irrespective of the ends. ").
16. 297 U.S. at 286-87. A commentator states that "[tlhe Court encountered great difficuliy in
deciding just what process is due at interrogation. Its decisions in this area prior to Escobedo v.
Illinois. 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (right to counsel applies during interrogation) were based on the
premise that 'the public interest requires that interrogation.., at a police station should not be
completelv forbidden, so long as it is conducted fairly....' State v. Smith. 32 N.J. 501, 531. 161
A.2d 520. 537 (1960). " 79 HARV. L- REv. supra note 10. at 962.
17. lvons v. Oklahoma. 322 U.S. 596. 605 (1943). The Court in Lyons stated that "[a] coerced
confession is offensive to basic standards of justice, not because the victim has a legal grievance
against the police. but [because[ declarations procured bs toiture. are not premises from which a
civilized forum swill infer guilt. -Id.
18. McNabb v. United States. 318 U.S. 332 (1943). In M,1cNabb. suspects wsere arrested and put
in a barren cell for fourteen hours instead of being brought before a judicial officer, as required by
law,., to determine the justification tor their detention. They were questioned unremittingly for two
days. A confession w s'as obtained without benefit of counsel. The Cotrt demonstrated its contempt
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the constitutional issues when it held invalid a confession obtained
in violation of a rule of criminal procedure 9 requiring that an ar-
rested person be promptly taken before a magistrate. 
20
Despite the ambiguity regarding the rationale for exclusion of'
confessions, the fourteenth amendment due process clause was
easily applied when the cases involved statements fostered by
threats or physical violence. 2 1 The problem of an intelligible theory
of the function of the confession rule began to appear, however, in
cases involving subtle psychological pressures because it was no
longer possible to assume that the resultant confessions were
unreliable as evidence of guilt.
22
for such police practices by reversing the suspect's convictions. The McNabb opinion iint'd out fl
the statutes requiring a suspect to be promplly taken before a ,iulieial iili'cer were to plrevent sei rc
interrogation and third degrec practices. Id. at 343-44.
See McCormick, Some Prolems and I)evelopmrent" in the Andmissibility of Confession., 24 "'Fx. I,. R tv.
239, 270-71 (1946).
19. Rule 5(a) of the Federal Ruls of Criminal Procedure states as ollows:
An officer making an arrest unld'r a warrant issu'd Upn a complaint or any person
making an arrest without .i warrant shall take 1he arrested Person without unnecessary
delay before the nearest availalhe litderal magistrate or, in the event that a li'deral
magistrate is not reasonably availal', Ibefor' a stat' oir l'cal judicial ofith'er auttrized
by 18 U.S.C. 3041.
FED. R, CRIM. P. 5(a).
20. McNabb v. United States. 318 U. S. 332 (1943). The McNahb rule requires suppressin of'
incriminating statements obtained (iiring illegal detention ol a suspect held in violation ila fi'dcral
statute requiring prompt appearance bIlire a magistratc to dtiermine ift here is cause to hod him ir
trial. Id. at 341-42. The rule was established to keep lower courts itim evading th princ ipal
enunciated in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1935), that a coerced conlssin is nut
federally admissible. Prior tio McNabb, lower courts, eager to secture convictions, adtittid
confessions by finding no coercive police methios, based on 1hi testimony of the police rather tian
deniidant's test imony alleging coerc ive pol iie meth ods.
The lower courts efltit ively nullified .AcNabb by requiring a showing of a causal (onneiction
between the i(onfession and deention, i.e., t showing oi'ioerciin. Amsterdam, ThSuprme Caurt and
the Rztht qfSuspecti in Criminal Cases, N.Y. UNiv. I,. Rv-v. 785, 806-07 (1970).
The Court extended its cont'mpt lir coerc,A onfissiins by finding that any confiission during a
period of unnecessary delay was aulomaticallv inadmissible. Mallory v. United Staies, 354 U.S. 449
(1957). See.4enerally, Hogan & Snie, The McNabh-AMallory Rule. ltv Rite, Rationale and Rescue, 47 F;vo.
L..J. 1 (1958).
This rule, however, applied only o fieral cases and not the stais. The Court closed in on the
state confession problem by making increased resort to thi right to Cimnsel guaranteed by the sixth
amendment and the privilege against sell-incri i inat ion in thi fifth ameniment, rather than
resorting to the fourteenth amieniment. In Spano v. New Ytork, 360 U.S. 315 (1959), although the
Court found a confession coerced adl decided the cast on die process grounds, it appeared that the
Court reached th' view that once a person was itrmally charged by indictment or information his
right to counsel had begun. ,e W. I,oe:KiAIIT, Y. KAMINAR .1J. Ct-HOPER, COsTiri'TI it.NAt LAv
658-59 (4th ed. I 975).
Five years alter Spano, the Court in Massiah v. United Statis, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), applied the
sixth amendment right to counsel in riv:rsing a pe'titioner's conviction which was based on
statements elii:itcd by the polit' afir petitioner had been indi ted and in the absence of his counsel.
The sixth amendment tto the United States Ctonstitution states in pertinent part that, "iln tll
criminal prosecutions, the accusetd shall iniov the riieht ... to hav the assistane' of counsel for his
defense," U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
21, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936). For a discussion of this case, see tupra note
15.
22. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944). In Ashcrafi, thi ilelidndant's conviction was
reversed because the confession had been obtaineil] afttr 36 hturs of interrogation of the t'findant by
the police. In effect, the Court ruld that the extended qlustioning raised it conclusiv' presumption
of coercion. The result reach-[ b' the Court rei'leted 'ss of ita concern with the contifession's
reliability and evidence of guilt in the particular case than disaptroval of nolice miethtdt which a
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The Supreme Court in Culombe v. Connecticut,23 articulated a
test for the admissibility of a defendant's confession based on the
voluntariness of the confession, which was determined by the
totality of the circumstances. 24 The refusal of the police or other
interrogators to permit the subject of the interrogation to consult
with counsel was regarded as part of the totality of circumstances
determining the voluntariness of a statement. 25  Other factors
included the extent of cross-questioning, any undue delay in
arraignment, and failure to caution a prisoner. 26 These factors were
considered in the light of all of the surrounding circumstances -
the duration and condition of detention, the attitude of the police
toward the suspect, the suspect's physical and mental state as well
as the various pressures which sustain or weaken his power to resist
or his self control. 27 These factors were used to determine if a
suspect had been denied due process of law as guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment.
28
The United States Supreme Court in Massiah v. United States,
29
avoided the due process approach, 30  holding that the sixth
amendment's31 guarantee of the right to counsel in criminal
prosectuions required exclusion of incriminating statements elicited
by government agents in the absence of counsel after the accused
had been indicted.3 2 Shortly after Massiah, the Court used several
majority of the Court perceived as generally dangerous and subject'to serious abuse. Id. at 154-55.
Three cases decided in 1949 illustrate the attitude in confession cases at that time: Watts v.
Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949), and Harris v. South
Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949). There was no substantial evidence of overt physical brutality by the
police in any of these cases. Records, however, showed illegal detention, incommunicado
confinement, the moving of suspects from place to place during interrogation, and prolonged
questioning. In each case the conviction was reversed. 338 U.S. 49 at 55, 338 U.S. 62 at 66, 338
U.S. 68 at 71.
23. 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
24. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961). The Court in Culombe stated as follows:
The ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly established test in
Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the test of voluntariness. Is the
confession a product ofan essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker? If it
is, if he has willed to confess it may be used against him. Ifit is not, if his will has been
overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his
confession offends due process .... The line of distinction is that at which governing
self-direction is lost and compulsion, of whatever nature or however infused, propels
or helps propel the confession.
Id.
25. Id. at 601, see also id. at 602 n.54.
26. Id. at 601.
27. Id. at 602.
28. Id.
29. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
30. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964). The Massiah Court followed the four
concurring Justices in Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). Spano reversed a criminal
conviction, based on an improperly admitted confession, on fourteenth amendment grounds. The
concurring Justices, however, pointed out that the conviction could have been reversed solely on the
ground that the defendant was denied his right to counsel. Id. at 324.
31. See supra note 20 for pertinent parts of the sixth amendment iti the United States
Constitution.
32. 377 U.S. at 206 (1964). The Court in Massiah stated as follows:
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of the factors of the voluntariness approach to formulate the
elements of a relatively definite rule in Escobedo v. Illinois. 33
Miranda v. Arizona3 4 established more concrete guidelines for
custodial interrogation in an effort to guarantee suspects their sixth
amendment right to counsel and their fifth amendment privilege
against self incrimination. 35 Rather than focusing on the factors of
a particular case, Miranda established universally applicable
guidelines regarding the right to remain silent and the right to the
presence of counsel in police interrogations, whether state or
federal.3 6 The Miranda Court stressed that modern in-custody
interrogation practices are psychologically oriented 37  and
[Pletitioner was denied the basic protection fof the right to the assistance of counsel]
when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words,
which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him [by means of a co-defendant
cooperating with the government, who engaged the petitioner in conversation in the
presence of a hidden radio transmitter] after he had been indicted and in the absence
ofhis counsel.
Id.
The Massiah rule was held equally binding on the states in State v. McLeod, 173 Ohio St, 520,
184 N.E.2d 101 (1962), remanded, 378 U.S. 582, on remand, I Ohio St. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 349
(1964), rev''d381 U.S. 356 (1965).
33. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Escobedo, suspected of murdering his brother-in-law, was arrested
and taken to police headquarters for questioning. His repeated requests to speak to his retained
counsel were denied. Escobedo's lawyer spent three to four hours at the police station trying to see
his client, but was rebuffed by various police officers. Although Escobedo and his lawyer had
previously discussed what petitioner should do in the event of police questioning, no officer advised
petitioner of his constitutional rights during the course of his interrogation. On the basis of the
resulting confession. Escobedo was convicted of murder. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the
conviction. People v. Escobedo, 28 Ill. 2d 41, 190 N.E.2d 825,827 (1963). On certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court, in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964), reversed, stating as follows:
We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the
suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of
interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has
requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police
have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent.
the accused has been denied "the Assistance of Counsel" . ., and that no statement
elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used against him at a criminal
trial.
Id. at 49 0- 9 1.
34. 384 U.S. 436(1966).
35. Niranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444 (1966). In its holding, the Miranda Court stated as
follows:
[T]he prosecution mav not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory.
stemming from custodial interrogatton of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use
if procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self incrimination....
As for procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are
devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous
opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any
questioning. the person must be warned he has a right to remain silent, that ans
statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right
to the presence ofan attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive
effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently.
Ild.
36. Id. at 467-70.
37. Id. at 448-58. The Court pointed out some of the interrogation procedures set out in various
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inherently compulsive,38 and that the policy behind its decision was
to guarantee the privilege against self-incrimination by coercive
police methods. 39  Miranda also pointed out the inherent
coerciveness of station-house, in-custody interrogation. 40 Because
of the importance of the privilege against self-incrimination and the
right to counsel, Miranda set very strict standards for finding a
waiver of these rights.
4
1
The Court began retreating from the Miranda rationale to the
pre-Miranda voluntariness standard with Harris v. New York, 42 in
which the United States Supreme Court held that a suspect's
inculpatory statements after defective Miranda warnings had been
given were admissible, but only for impeachment purposes.
43 The
Harris Court stated that it does not follow from Miranda that
evidence inadmissible in the prosecution's case in chief against the
accused is barred for all purposes, provided that the trustworthiness
of the evidence satisfies legal standards. 44 The Court's rationale in
Harris was that a defendant should not be able to resort to
perjurious testimony in reliance on the prosecution's disability to
challenge his credibility.
45
police manuals that involve applying psychological pressure on suspects, such as isolating the suspect
il liititttliar surroundings, displaying an air of contfith'nc as to the suspect's guilt and directing
(Iltestttts towards he reasons why tihe suspect did tiact. rather tian asking whether he did it. Id. at
38. I( i( 457-58. The Miranda Court stated as tdllows:
'I'l' current piractice ot" incommunicado iterrogatiOtt is at odds with one of' our
Nation's most cherished principles - that the individual ma not he compelled to
imrittinate himself. Unless adequawt protetive desices are employ ed to dispel tite
otIpolsion inherent in custodial surroundings. to staenieto obtained frott the
i tli'lidattt tatll truly he the prodct of'his free choice.
I'.
i). d. at 460. The Court stated that all the pii cies of the pri ilge against self incrimination
itt tt one overriding thought: tite constitutional ftundation itderlying the privilege is the
respect a government - state or federal -t must accord to thite dignity and integrity of its citizens."
Id.
40. 1d. at 461. The Court in Miranda state[ "'as ti practical tmaer. the compulsion to speak in
titi isolated setting of the police station mav \elf lie greater than in courts or other official
in estigations, where there are often impariial tibser ers tt guard against intimidation or trickerv."
Id
41. Id. at 436. The following considerations wei set out by tit Court: (I) Failure to request a
lawver (toes not constitute a waiver and tmst he spicificalls tatide. Id. at 470. (2) The government
retains a heavy burden of proving a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights by the defendant. Id. at
475. (3) A waiver will not be presumed from the silenct of the accused. An express statement,
however, that the suspect is wi ling to make a stat ettit anti does not want an attorney. followed
closely by a statement, could constitute a waiver. Id.
42. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). Set' Comment. 13 SAN DitFto I. Rrv. 861. 874 (1976). Se'gneralt 54
N.D.l. RF,\!. 307, 310(1977).
43. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 223-26 (1971).
44. Id. at 224.
45. Id. at 224-26. The Harris Court further reasoned thit a sufficient deterrence of proscribed
police conduct is realized when the evidence in question is tiad unav a ilable to the prosecution's case
in chief. Id. at 225.
Harris was later reaffirmed by Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975), which held that when a
suspect in police custody has been given the warnings required bv Miranda. and the indis idual has
265
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In Lego v. 7womey,4 6  the United States Supreme Court
demonstrated its rejection of the protective stance of Miranda by
passing up an opportunity to, strengthen Miranda's exclusionary
rules. 47  In that case the Supreme Court rejected petitioner's
contention that evidence offered against a defendant at a criminal
trial and challenged on constitutional grounds must be determined
admissible beyond a reasonable doubt in order to give adequate
protection to those values that the exclusionary rules are designed
to protect. 48 The Court determined, however, that the emphasis of
its prior opinions on the importance of values sought to be protected
by cases such as Miranda is not sufficient in itself to require the
prosecution to prove by a higher standard than a preponderance of
the evidence that a confession was in fact voluntarily obtained.
49
The necessity of complying with Miranda standards was further
limited in Michigan v. Tucker,50 in which the United States Supreme
Court approved the prosecution's use of evidence directly derived
from a defendant's statements elicited by the police in violation of
Miranda. 5' The Court interpreted Miranda as outlining
recommended procedural safeguards for protecting fifth
amendment rights by reasoning that the omission of procedural
safeguards does not necessarily constitute a violation of the
underlying rights. 52  Therefore, when a violation of Miranda
guidelines occurs, it appears that the per se rule is abandoned and a
balancing test is applied.5 3  The products of true compulsion,
however, are excludable as violative of the fifth amendment. 54
In 1977, the Court in Brewer v. Williams, 51 reaffirmed Miranda
requested that he be allowed to telephone his attorney, anv inculpatory inforition that he has given
Ieftore his attorney arrives may be used for the purpose of impeachmcn at trial. Id. at 720-24.
46. 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
47. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 487-89 (1972).
48. Id. at 487.
49. Id. at 488-89.
50. 417 U .S. 433 (1974). See also Pelander, Michtian v. Tucker. A W4'arning About Miranda, 17 ARIZ.
I. REv. 188, 189(1975).
51. M ichigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450-52 (1974).
52. Id. at 445-46. See alto Comment, 27 ME. L. R rv. 365 (1975).
53. 417 U.S. at 450. The Court stated that "when balancing the interests involved, we must
weigh the strong interest under any system of justice of making available to the trier of fact all
concededly relevant and trustworthy evidence which either party seeks to adduce. " Id.
This interest of society must also be balanced against the desire to control unautihorized police
conduct. Ctmment, 13 SAN DiEcro L. REv. 861,875 (1976).
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), also adopted a balancing approach to the Miranda
exclusionary rule. The Mosley Court further weakened Miranda by sanctioning renewed questioning
of a suspect after an expressed desire to remain silent. Id. at 102-03.
In Mosley, two hours after the defendant exercised his right to remain silent, another officer took
hitI o a tdifferent interrogation room and again informed him of his rights. After the defendant
waived his rights, the officer confronted him with an incriminating statement and the defendant
c issed. Id at 98.
54. 384 U.S. at 479.
55. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
266
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by a 5-4 opinion. Finding no waiver of the right to counsel, the
Court, in reversing a murder conviction, stated the proper
standard for determining the question of waiver as a matter of
federal constitutional law to be "an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege." 56 Using the language
of Miranda, the United States Supreme Court stated that "courts
must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver,"'5 7 and
in this case the state had not sustained its burden of proving a
waiver.
5 8
Unlike Brewer where the Court found an effective assertion of
the defendant's right to counsel, in Butler there was no evidence of
any affirmative request for counsel.5 9 When advised of his right to
counsel the defendant was silent. 60 The Court could not interpret
such a situation as an affirmative assertion of the right to counsel
nor did it find the defendant's silence as to his right to counsel to be
a waiver of that right. 61
Yet, consistent with the trend of denigrating the prophylaxes of
the Miranda rules in the area of waiver of the rights secured by
Miranda,62 the Butler Court said that North Carolina's rule that an
56. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977) (citing Johnson v. Zerbst. 304 U.S. 458, 464
(1938)).
In,Johnson, the Court stated as follows:
A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment ofa known right
or privilege. The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the
right to counsel must depend, in each ease, upon the particular facts and
circumstances surrounding that case. including the background. experiencc. and
condluci t of the accused.
Id.
57. 430 U.S. at 404.
58. Id. at 404-05. The Court found that the defendant's consultation with two attorneys
and his statement that he intended to tell the whole story after seeing his attorney were effective
assertions of his right to counsel. Therefore, the incriminating statements he made in the absence of
counsel should not have been admitted. Id.
A strong dissent in Brewer articulated what appears to be the basis for the majority opinion in
Btalcr. This dissent stated as follows:
Iln cases where incriminating disclosures are voluntarily made without coercion, and
hence not violative of the Fifth Amendment, but are obtained in violation ofone of the
liranda prophylaxes, suppression is no longer automatic. Rather. we weigh the
deterrent effect on unlawful police misconduct, together with the normative Fifth
Amendment justifications for suppression, against "the strong interest under any
system of justice of making available to the trier of fact all concededly relevant and
trustworthy evidence which either party seeks to adduce.
Id. at 424 (Burger. C.,].. dissenting).
59. -U.S. at _. 99 S. Ct. at 1756.
60. Id.
61. Id. at _ . 99 S. Ct. at 1757. Quoting from ,iranda. the Butler Court stated "a valid
waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given..." Id.
62. Id. Commenting on what the Court did not say in Miranda. the Butler Court found implied
waivers of the rights secured by .Mliranda to be recognized under the Miranda opinion. Speaking about
Miranda. the Court in Butler stated as follows:
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implicit waiver of Miranda rights will not support a waiver of those
rights is too inflexible, and inconsistent with the Court's
interpretation of Miranda.63 Therefore, the United States Supreme
Court vacated the North Carolina Supreme Court's judgment and
remanded the case for further proceedings 64 to determine whether
the totality of the circumstances, including the background,
experience and conduct of the accused, was such as to find an
implied waiver of the rights secured by Miranda.65 Thus, the Court
is forsaking the broad, prophylactic rules of Miranda in favor of the
pre-Miranda voluntariness standard determined by an analysis of
the particular facts and circumstances in each case. 66
A North Dakota case on the issue of the voluntariness of a
waiver of a constitutional right is State v. Manning,67 which dealt
with the waiver of fourth amendment rights attendant to a consent
search. 68  The North Dakota Supreme Court used the same
language as the United States Supreme Court used in Butler in
explaining that a determination of a waiver of constitutional rights
depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 69 The
Mannin.g court also stated that although a waiver is not to be
Thus the Court held that an express stateme n (din constitic ;i waiver, anid that
silence alone after such warnings cannot do so. But i'C (:our( did not hold ithai sucha ni
express statement is indispensable to finding of'waivr.
An express written or oral statement iof waiver of thi right to rernairn silent ,r III
right to counsel is usually strong priof of tih( validity of li;ha waiv'r. but is not
inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver. The question is riot one of
form, but rather whether the defendant in fact knowingls and v<luniarilv waivd the'
rights delineated in the Miranda case. As was uni(iuivocally said in Miranda, nrr'
silence is not enough .... The courts must prisume that a dei'nilant did rioi waive his
rights: the prosccution's burden is great; but in at least somei casis waive'r can bc
clearly in ferrid from the actions anl words olt hi- persoin int'rrigatd.
Id.
63. Id. at-__, 99 S. Ct. at 1759.
64. Id.
65. Id. at-, 99S. Ct. at 1758.
66. Seesupra note 23 for a discussion ofthe pre-Miranda volu ntariniss standard.
The dissent thoiught that the Butler case-by-casi approach adopt'd by (th majoritv flt too much
discretion with the lower courts, and that the minimal iri( c(hral rcquiri'nits if Miranda ss'erc
insignificant when balanced against the possibility iifan error in judgm'nt with re'spict to a susp( I's
waiver of his Miranda rights. - U.S. at __, 99 S. Ci. at 1760 (Brennan, Marshall and St'ins .,
dissenting). The main thrust iif the dissent in Butler is that thi majority opinion will allow iouris tf,
construct inferencis from ambiguous words anti gesturi's. ani that thi n'mis' of iranda rer'quiri's
that ambiguity bc interpriteI against the interroigator. Id. l _. 99 S. Cf. at 1759. The dfissint
contends that some judges faced with words and actions of i n'riain eioaning may findi a waiver
where none occurred iithers may fail to find a waiver where it did ccur. Id. at __ , 99 S. Ct. at
1760. In the first instanic'. the defendant's rights will have bli' n .'iuilatcd in the second instance,
society's interest in effective law enforcement will have been friistr .I d.
67. 134 N.W.2d9l, 97 (N.D. 1965).
68. State v. Manning, 134 N.W.2d 91, 95-96 (N.I). 1965). 'he riquirements of a waiver of
rights secured by Miranda are arguably the same, since they also deal with waivable rights which give
rise to the excludability ofcvitlence from trial if those rights ari' violat'd anil not waived.
69. Id. at 97. The Court stated "[wihether there has been an intelligent waiver ofconstitutional
rights, therefore, depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the
background, the expericnice. and the conduct of the accus 'd.' Id. See also __ U.S. at __ , 99 S.
Ct. at 1758.
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"inferred lightly" 70 it may be inferred, but the waiver must be
"clearly and intentionally made. "I
The North Dakota Supreme Court in State v. Thompson
72
referred to Manning on the issue of voluntariness. 7 3 In Thompson the
court further stated that Miranda does not create a per se proscription
against further interrogation after an individual indicates he wishes
to remain silent74 because a defendant is not foreclosed from
voluntarily waiving his constitutional rights at any stage of an
investigation or prosecution.7 5 The Thompson court explained its
decision as to whether the defendant waived his right to silence was
based on an examination of the evidence to determine what factors,
in addition to continued questioning after an indication of a desire
to remain silent, were present. 76
Both Manning and Thompson indicate that the North Dakota
Supreme Court examines all of the facts and circumstances of each
case to determine whether a suspect has waived his constitutional
rights.7 7 Thompson rejects a per se interpretation of Miranda.7 8
Applying their reasoning to a question of the waiver of the right to
counsel, these cases indicate that North Dakota is in accord with
the holding of North Carolina v. Butler.
JACK KENNELLY
70. 134 N.W.2d at 97.
71. Id.
72. 256 N.W.2d 706 (N.D. 1977).
73. State v. Thompson, 256 N.W.2d 706, 710(N.D. 19771.
74. Id. at 710-11,
75. Id. at 710.
76. Id. at 712.
77. State v. Manning, 134 N.W.2d at 97, and StatO \. Thompson. 256 N.W.2d at 712.
78. 256 N.W,2d at 710-11.

